15 ยท Techniques
Bootkit techniques
Each page explains one technique the catalogue's bootkit families use, at the level a responder needs: what it changes and where in the boot chain, the traces it leaves, how to check a host offline and live, what the checker sees, and how to recover. Techniques are grouped by what they achieve for the bootkit; the matrix shows which family uses which. Techniques of rootkits that load later, as drivers or kernel modules, are on rootkits.dev.
Persisting in the boot chain7
Where bootkit code is stored so it runs at every boot: a module added to or patched in the SPI flash firmware, a boot manager replaced on the EFI system partition, the MBR or a volume's boot sectors rewritten, or sectors outside any partition. The place decides what survives a reinstall or a new disk, and what an offline check can see: the ESP and the disk's sectors can be read from a collection, the firmware needs a dump.
- Adding a DXE driver to the firmwareHow LoJax added its own DXE driver to a board's SPI flash firmware, why disk checks and Secure Boot miss it, and how to dump and compare firmware to find one.Firmware1 family
- Hidden storage outside the partitionsWhere legacy bootkits keep encrypted code outside any partition: the gap after the MBR, the end of the disk, a partition of their own. Traces and checks.BootWindows5 families
- Infecting the VBR, its BPB or the IPLHow Rovnix, Gapz and a TDL4 variant hijacked the volume boot record, its BPB hidden-sectors field or the 15-sector IPL, the traces left and how to check them.BootWindows3 families
- Patching an existing firmware moduleHow MoonBounce and CosmicStrand patched CORE_DXE and CSMCORE inside SPI flash firmware, why only a module-by-module diff finds it, and how to check and recover.Firmware2 families
- Replacing or patching the ESP boot managerHow UEFI bootkits replace or patch bootmgfw.efi, GRUB or the fallback loader on the EFI system partition, the traces this leaves, and how to check a host.BootWindowsLinux4 families
- Replacing the MBR boot codeHow bootkits replace the master boot code in sector 0 to run before Windows, what TDL4, Gapz, ESPecter and FinSpy left on disk, and how to check it offline.BootWindows4 families
- Writing OS files from firmwareHow LoJax's SecDxe wrote autoche.exe and rpcnetp.exe into Windows through its own NTFS driver and edited BootExecute before boot: traces, checks, recovery.FirmwareWindows1 family
Getting past Secure Boot4
How a bootkit gets code to run where the platform should refuse it: an old, still-trusted boot manager booted on purpose, an attacker key enrolled in shim's list, a flaw in the firmware's own image parser, or flash write protections the firmware left open. Their traces are split between files staged on the ESP and places the platform keeps: firmware variables, the Secure Boot databases, the flash settings.
- Enrolling an attacker key in shim's MOK listHow BlackLotus and Bootkitty enrolled their own certificate in shim's MokList so Secure Boot trusts a self-signed bootkit, where it shows, and how to remove it.BootWindowsLinux2 families
- Firmware image parser exploits (LogoFAIL)LogoFAIL flaws in UEFI boot logo parsers let a crafted image run code during boot, past Secure Boot; Bootkitty used one to enroll its key. Exposure and fixes.Firmware1 family
- Rollback to a vulnerable signed boot managerHow BlackLotus booted an old, Microsoft-signed boot manager to get past Secure Boot (CVE-2022-21894), what revocation changes, and how to check a Windows host.BootWindows1 family
- Writing the SPI flash from the operating systemHow LoJax's tools used the signed RwDrv.sys driver to dump and rewrite SPI flash firmware, the BIOSWE, BLE, SMM_BWP and PRx protections, and how to check them.FirmwareWindows1 family
Taking over the boot3
How a bootkit stays in control from one boot stage to the next: hooking the firmware's boot services or the BIOS disk interrupt, patching each loader in memory after it has been read and checked, and switching off the kernel's code signing before it starts. The loader and kernel files on disk stay as they were, so these steps show mostly in memory, in Measured Boot logs, or through the stage that started them.
- Hooking the BIOS disk service (int 13h)How legacy bootkits hook BIOS interrupt 13h to patch the Windows boot manager, loader and kernel in memory: TDL4, Gapz, Rovnix, and what is left to check.BootWindows5 families
- Hooking the UEFI hand-over to the OSHow bootkits hook ExitBootServices, OslArchTransferToKernel and GRUB to patch the kernel in memory, why the disk stays clean, and what Measured Boot can show.BootWindowsLinux6 families
- Turning off driver signing from the boot chainHow bootkits defeat kernel code signing before Windows or Linux enforces it: TDL4's WinPE trick, ESPecter's DSE patch, BlackLotus and HVCI, Bootkitty. Checks.BootWindowsLinux6 families
Hiding and protecting itself1
How a bootkit keeps its sectors and files from being seen or repaired once the system runs: a hooked disk driver that returns the original boot code when the infected sectors are read, and blocks writes to them. A system in that state lies about its own disk, which is why a disk read offline, or from trusted media, is the one to trust.
Which family uses which technique
Techniques by goal down the side, the catalogue's families across the top, grouped by where they live: in the firmware, or on the disk in the UEFI or legacy BIOS boot path. A lit node means the family's page documents its use of the technique.
ATT&CK coverage
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques each technique page maps to.