Walk-Through: Checking Three Hosts for Bootkits
A worked bootkit check of three synthetic hosts: a clean ESP and two Measured Boot logs, a Gapz-like disk head and a BlackLotus-like EFI system partition.
TL;DR. "Try a sample" on the checker opens three synthetic hosts, 12 files in all:
- FIN-WKS-07, the Windows 11 workstation of the sister sites' svc_backup story. Its BCD and its Measured Boot logs for boots 41 and 42 raise no finding: Secure Boot on, the Windows Boot Manager as the only boot application, default settings. The boot chain was clean when the intrusion began; what the attacker tried that morning, a kernel driver Windows refused, is on rootkits.dev.
- LAB-VM-01, a lab disk head. Unknown MBR code, high-entropy data before the first partition, and an NTFS boot sector whose hidden-sectors value points at that data: the Gapz layout.
- LAB-VM-02, a lab EFI system partition. A staging folder, an extra
grubx64.efiandwinload.efi, and a BCD that loads another store: the BlackLotus layout.
Read each finding with its evidence, decide the next step, and write down what files cannot show: firmware, UEFI variables and memory.
The sample
The three hosts are invented, and every file is synthetic and harmless. Placeholder executables are valid files that do nothing, certificates are generated, and the disk sectors are pseudo-random filler. All times are UTC.
| Host | What it is | Files | Modules with findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIN-WKS-07 | Windows 11 workstation, collected at 10:55:12 on 2026-09-14: its EFI system partition and its Measured Boot folder | 3 | None (esp and measuredboot read it) |
| LAB-VM-01 | The first MiB of a lab VM's MBR disk | 1 | bootsector |
| LAB-VM-02 | A lab VM's EFI system partition | 8 | esp |
FIN-WKS-07 belongs to the intrusion that the sister sites follow on 2026-09-14. The lab hosts stand apart: they show two boot-chain layouts from public reports, built from placeholder bytes.
FIN-WKS-07: a clean boot chain
What the other sites already show
| Time | Event | Where it is told |
|---|---|---|
| 09:57:41 | svc_backup created (Security 4720) | BITS Parser's walk-through |
| 09:59:28 | svc_backup logs on over RDP | Same |
| 10:06:51 | Defender detects m64.exe (1116) | Defender Parser's walk-through |
| 10:07:31 to 10:07:33 | svc_backup installs the kernel driver service IntelNetDiag for an unsigned driver in C:\ProgramData\Intel; Windows refuses to load it (CodeIntegrity 3004, System 7000) | rootkits.dev's walk-through |
| 10:07:36 | Tamper protection refuses a change to DisableRealtimeMonitoring (5013) | Defender Parser's walk-through |
| 10:08:12 | Two 5007 events add the exclusions for C:\ProgramData\Intel and m64.exe | Same |
| 10:09:44 | m64.exe runs from the excluded folder | Same |
An administrator who tries to load a kernel driver may also go for the boot chain, which runs before any driver signing check. This host's boot evidence answers part of that question.
What the checker reads
| File | Content | Findings |
|---|---|---|
ESP\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\BCD (2026-09-14 07:52:10) | A store with 11 objects; the 6 boot entries listed as items carry default settings | None |
C:\Windows\Logs\MeasuredBoot\0000000041-0000000000.log (2026-09-11 07:58:52) | Boot 41: Secure Boot on, \EFI\Microsoft\Boot\bootmgfw.efi as the only boot application, test signing off, code integrity on, 19 modules loaded by the boot loader | None |
C:\Windows\Logs\MeasuredBoot\0000000042-0000000000.log (2026-09-14 07:52:31) | Boot 42: the same boot application, the same settings, the same 19 modules | None |
The esp module notes that the partition holds no EFI binaries: Microsoft's files cannot be shipped, so no boot manager signature was checked. The digests in the Measured Boot logs are stand-ins.
What it means
- The last boot before the intrusion was normal. Boot 42 started on 2026-09-14 around 07:52, two hours before svc_backup logged on. Its log lists one boot application, the Windows Boot Manager at its usual path, with Secure Boot on. A bootkit that changes the measured boot path, as BlackLotus does by adding
grubx64.efiandwinload.efi, would show there; nothing does, and boot 41 matches it. - Windows' own switches were at their defaults. Test signing was off and code integrity on, which is why Windows refused the unsigned driver at 10:07:33, as rootkits.dev's walk-through shows. The BCD agrees: its boot entries carry default settings.
- No log covers the attack. The collection, taken at 10:55:12, holds no boot after 42, so a change made to the ESP during the intrusion would appear only in the next boot's log. The BCD's file time, 07:52:10, is from before the intrusion.
What it cannot show
The firmware: the module does not compare PCR 0 measurements or hold vendor reference values. The EFI binaries themselves, which the sample does not ship. The UEFI variables (db, dbx, the MOK list), which live in NVRAM. And everything outside the boot chain: the driver attempt and the Defender changes are read from the SYSTEM hive and the event logs, on rootkits.dev and the sister sites.
Next steps
- On a real host, collect the whole ESP with its EFI binaries, not only the BCD, and check their signers: How to check the EFI system partition for a bootkit offline has the commands.
- If the host reboots before it is rebuilt, collect the new Measured Boot log and compare it with boot 42: a new boot application or a changed digest after the intrusion needs an explanation. Reading Measured Boot logs shows how.
- Treat the host as compromised for the reasons the other sites give:
m64.exeran at 10:09:44, and svc_backup had administrator rights.
LAB-VM-01: a Gapz-like disk head
disk0.img holds the first MiB of a 20 GiB MBR disk. Its file time is 2026-10-06 09:30:00; disk structures carry no times.
| Sectors | Content | Finding (severity) |
|---|---|---|
| LBA 0 | Placeholder boot code; one active NTFS partition at LBA 63 | "MBR boot code does not match a known loader" (medium) |
| LBA 33 to 62 | Pseudo-random data: 15,291 non-zero bytes from LBA 33, entropy 7.99 bits per byte | "Data before the first partition does not match a known loader" (medium) |
| LBA 63 | A standard NTFS boot sector with Windows' boot code, but a BPB hidden-sectors value of 32 for a partition that starts at 63 | "VBR hidden-sectors value differs from the partition start" (high), linked to Gapz; the value points into the sectors before the first partition, where data starts at LBA 33 |
| LBA 64 to 78 | Windows' NTFS loader, recognised | None |
What it means
The NTFS boot code reads its next sectors from the position the hidden-sectors field gives. Here that is LBA 33, the start of the high-entropy data, so a BIOS boot from this disk would run that data instead of Windows' loader, which is left untouched. ESET reported that Gapz changes only these 4 bytes and keeps its code before the first partition when there is room. The checker links only the hidden-sectors finding to Gapz. The unknown MBR code is a separate trait: MBR bootkits such as TDL4 replace that code, while Gapz's VBR variant does not need to; read each finding on its own.
There are innocent explanations for each finding alone: other boot managers, a partition moved by a tool that did not update its boot sector. Together, and pointing at each other, they need an image and an explanation.
What it cannot show
The image is a disk head: the module notes that the partition runs past the end of the file, so it skipped the end-of-disk checks, and Gapz can also keep its code after the last partition. The sectors hold noise and placeholders, not code to analyse. A disk read through the running system could have shown clean sectors, since these bootkits filter disk reads.
Next steps
Image the whole disk from a clean environment, extract LBA 33 to 62 for analysis, compare the MBR and boot sector with a clean disk of the same build, then rebuild as the Gapz page describes and move the machine to UEFI with Secure Boot.
LAB-VM-02: a BlackLotus-like ESP
Windows was installed on 2026-03-02 at 09:14:08, the last clean boot was on 2026-10-30, and an installer ran on 2026-11-02 at 14:21. The esp module finds:
| File | Content | Findings (severity) |
|---|---|---|
EFI\Microsoft\Boot\BCD (14:21:37) | {bootmgr} with bcdfilepath set to \system32\bcd and avoidlowmemory 0x10000000 | "The boot manager is told to load another BCD store" (high); "The BCD sets avoidlowmemory" (medium) |
EFI\Microsoft\Boot\BCDR (2026-10-30 08:02:11) | A backup of the original BCD | "BCDR does not belong in the Windows boot folder" (medium) |
EFI\Microsoft\Boot\bootmgfw.efi (14:21:36) | Placeholder signed by "Synthetic Shim Publisher (sample)", issued by "Synthetic Third-Party UEFI CA (sample)"; the digest matches | "The Windows Boot Manager is not signed by a Windows production CA" (high); "is much newer than the other files in its folder", by 124 days (medium) |
EFI\Microsoft\Boot\grubx64.efi (14:21:36) | Placeholder signed by "Synthetic Self-Signed CA (sample)" | "A self-signed signature on" the file (high); "grubx64.efi does not belong in the Windows boot folder" (high); newer than its folder (medium) |
EFI\Microsoft\Boot\winload.efi (2026-03-02) | Unsigned placeholder | "winload.efi does not belong in the Windows boot folder" (high); "An unsigned EFI binary" (low) |
system32\bcd (14:21:34) | A loader object with testsigning, nointegritychecks and truncatememory 0x10000000 | "A system32 folder at the root of the EFI system partition" (high); "The BCD enables test signing" (high); "The BCD disables integrity checks" (high); "The BCD sets truncatememory" (high) |
BOOTSTAT.DAT, boot.stl | Windows' own files | None |
Half of these findings (7 of the 14 flags) link to the BlackLotus page; the others describe the layout without naming a family.
What it means
The layout is the one ESET's report and Microsoft's guidance describe after the installer runs: a staging folder holding the attacker's BCD, whose settings drive the exploit of CVE-2022-21894; a replaced bootmgfw.efi; a self-signed grubx64.efi that shim starts through an enrolled Machine Owner Key; the original boot manager renamed winload.efi, which keeps its old time; and BCDR, a backup of the BCD from the last clean boot. Times on a FAT partition are local times the collecting machine can misread, so the 124 days are a lead; the sample's times are UTC.
Placeholders, not the real files
The signature results differ from a real infection. A real bootmgfw.efi would be a shim signed through Microsoft's third-party UEFI CA: the same finding, linked to BlackLotus as well. A real winload.efi would be Microsoft's own boot manager, signed: "An unsigned EFI binary" would not appear, but "winload.efi does not belong in the Windows boot folder" would. The installer deletes its staged files; one was left in system32\ so that the folder appears in a collection, which cannot hold an empty folder.
What it cannot show
This host has only its ESP. Its Measured Boot logs would show grubx64.efi and winload.efi started from the Windows boot folder. Its SYSTEM hive would show whether memory integrity was turned off, a Windows-side check that rootkits.dev runs. The MOK list, db and dbx live in NVRAM, and the checker does not check signatures against a trust store or revocation list, so a revoked but validly signed boot manager would pass.
Next steps
Collect C:\Windows\Logs\MeasuredBoot\ and the SYSTEM hive, read the MOK list with mokutil --list-enrolled and the revocation state on the live host, and image the partition to recover the deleted staging files. Then follow the BlackLotus page: rebuild the ESP and Windows from trusted media, remove the attacker's MOK, and apply Microsoft's revocations. Checking the ESP for a bootkit offline covers each step.
The timelines
FIN-WKS-07, from its boot files and the sister sites:
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-11 07:58:52 | Boot 41's log written | Measured Boot log file time |
| 2026-09-14 07:52:10 | BCD written | ESP file time |
| 2026-09-14 07:52:31 | Boot 42's log written | Measured Boot log file time |
| 2026-09-14 09:59:28 | svc_backup logs on over RDP | Security log |
| 2026-09-14 10:07:31 to 10:07:33 | Kernel driver service installed, then refused by Windows | System and CodeIntegrity logs, on rootkits.dev |
| 2026-09-14 10:55:12 | Collection | Responder's notes |
LAB-VM-02, from its ESP file times:
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-02 | winload.efi keeps the time of the original boot manager, from the Windows installation at 09:14:08 | File time |
| 2026-10-30 08:02:11 | BCDR: the BCD of the last clean boot | File time |
| 2026-11-02 14:21:34 | system32\bcd written: the staging folder | File time |
| 2026-11-02 14:21:36 | bootmgfw.efi and grubx64.efi written | File times |
| 2026-11-02 14:21:37 | BCD rewritten to load the staged store | File time |
What the sample cannot show
- Firmware and NVRAM. No module reads the SPI flash, the MOK list,
dbordbx, and none compares firmware measurements between boots. - Real signatures and code. The lab binaries are placeholders with synthetic certificates, the Measured Boot digests are stand-ins, and the disk sectors are noise.
- Memory. In-memory patches made during boot, and any kernel code a bootkit starts later.
- The operating system. Drivers, kernel modules and preload libraries are rootkits.dev's half; its walk-through reads FIN-WKS-07's driver attempt and a Linux host with a hidden kernel module.
- Absence. A host with no findings means nothing was found in the files collected. Firmware implants such as MoonBounce leave no file, and a collection taken on a running compromised host can be filtered. What an offline bootkit check can and cannot prove goes through each layer.
Writing it up
- State what the files show: "The Measured Boot logs of FIN-WKS-07 for boots 41 and 42, the latter written at 2026-09-14 07:52:31 UTC, list
\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\bootmgfw.efias the only boot application, with Secure Boot on, test signing off and code integrity on." Not "the boot chain was not compromised". - For LAB-VM-01: "The NTFS boot sector at LBA 63 gives 32 hidden sectors, pointing at high-entropy data from LBA 33, the layout ESET describes for Gapz." Say the bytes were not analysed as code.
- For LAB-VM-02: name the layout and the reports it matches, and say which signature results would differ with the real files.
- For each host, list what was not collected and what only firmware, NVRAM or memory could show.
FAQ
Does the sample contain real bootkit code?
No. Every file is synthetic and harmless: the EFI binaries are valid-format placeholders that do nothing, the certificates are generated, the disk sectors are pseudo-random filler, the Measured Boot digests are stand-ins, and no real Microsoft, vendor or malware binary or hash is included. The lab hosts' binaries are placeholders, so their signature results differ from a real infection.
Does FIN-WKS-07's clean boot chain clear the host?
No. Its BCD and its Measured Boot logs for boots 41 and 42 show a normal Windows boot with Secure Boot on, but boot 42 started before the intrusion, so no log covers anything changed afterwards. The partition in the sample holds no EFI binaries, and the logs say nothing about the firmware or about the driver the attacker tried to load that morning.
Is LAB-VM-02 infected with BlackLotus?
The files show the layout ESET and Microsoft describe for BlackLotus: a staging folder, a replaced boot manager, a self-signed grubx64.efi, the renamed original as winload.efi and a BCD that loads another store. Naming the bootkit needs the real binaries, the Measured Boot logs, the MOK list and the revocation state of the machine.
What can the checker not see on these hosts?
Firmware, NVRAM and memory. It cannot say what is in the SPI flash, which certificates are in db, dbx and the MOK list, or what a bootkit patched in memory. It checks signatures offline, without a trust store or revocation list, and it reads only the files and sectors in the collection.
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Frequently asked questions
Does the sample contain real bootkit code?
No. Every file is synthetic and harmless: the EFI binaries are valid-format placeholders that do nothing, the certificates are generated, the disk sectors are pseudo-random filler, the Measured Boot digests are stand-ins, and no real Microsoft, vendor or malware binary or hash is included. The lab hosts' binaries are placeholders, so their signature results differ from a real infection.
Does FIN-WKS-07's clean boot chain clear the host?
No. Its BCD and its Measured Boot logs for boots 41 and 42 show a normal Windows boot with Secure Boot on, but boot 42 started before the intrusion, so no log covers anything changed afterwards. The partition in the sample holds no EFI binaries, and the logs say nothing about the firmware or about the driver the attacker tried to load that morning.
Is LAB-VM-02 infected with BlackLotus?
The files show the layout ESET and Microsoft describe for BlackLotus: a staging folder, a replaced boot manager, a self-signed grubx64.efi, the renamed original as winload.efi and a BCD that loads another store. Naming the bootkit needs the real binaries, the Measured Boot logs, the MOK list and the revocation state of the machine.
What can the checker not see on these hosts?
Firmware, NVRAM and memory. It cannot say what is in the SPI flash, which certificates are in db, dbx and the MOK list, or what a bootkit patched in memory. It checks signatures offline, without a trust store or revocation list, and it reads only the files and sectors in the collection.